Yesterday, the Canadian Prime Minister, Mark Carney, delivered a speech at the Davos World Economic Forum that is worth listening to. Here it is:

Evidently, with everything going on, he speaks about how the world is changing and how middle powers like Canada can react. He doesn’t directly point fingers—probably because it’s unnecessary—but it’s clear that the US is the one changing the world order, and doing so against, or perhaps independently of, the wishes of everyone else. At least independently of the wishes of everyone who was (or still is?) a US ally. He uses phrases like, “We are in the midst of a rupture.” He says you can’t tell fairy tales about the advantages of integration when it is precisely this integration that is being used as a weapon. He speaks of strategic autonomy as risk management, making it clear that it comes with a price. To see how fast the world is changing, it’s really worth listening to the whole thing. At the end of the day, this guy is Canadian. Canadian. Let me say it again: Canadian.

Now, Canada is probably (or perhaps was) the country most integrated with the US. The country most dependent on the US. The country that identified itself most with the US. Canadians used to tie themselves in knots to explain that they were not American, but apart from a more reasonable social welfare system, the main difference one noticed as a Spaniard when crossing the border was that Dunkin’ Donuts became Tim Hortons. I’m not sure how many differences one would see now, but I’m sure Canadians would be able to explain to you in much clearer terms that they are not Americans. As far as I can tell, the tariffs Trump imposed on Canada (and Mexico) weeks after taking office (for the second time), combined with the absurdity of the explanation and the talk of making Canada the 51st state, had the effect of an electric shock on Canadians, making them mentally ready to hear speeches like Carney’s. In fact, it seems to me that this is precisely the kind of speech Canadians wanted to hear. On the one hand, he wasn’t hiding that Canadians will have to come to terms with having lost something. The sentence “Nostalgia is not a strategy” carries a lot of weight in that speech. So does the statement, “We take the world as it is, not wait around for the world we wish to be,” but this one makes it clear that something can be done. Carney didn’t talk (this time) about “elbows up,” and he evidently didn’t talk about blood, toil, tears, and sweat, but this is the most Churchillian speech by a head of government I’ve heard in a long time. I guess one also heard wannabe Churchillian speeches during COVID, but Macron’s “mes chers concitoyens” still makes me cringe. Carney’s calm and measured style makes his speech vastly more effective.

It’s clear that the implosion of the US-led world order has changed—or is changing—a lot of things for many countries, and that change comes with risk. As Carney points out, change can also bring opportunity. But the risk must be managed, and that has a cost. That’s why countries all over have been hedging, trying to adapt to changes without changing too much. Countries have been telling themselves that this might just be a storm and that if they just heave to—translation for my mother: “ponerse al pairo”—they might be able to wait it out. They’ve also been telling themselves that it’s cheaper and less risky to adapt slowly than dramatically, and that therefore they need to buy time. Canada didn’t get that option and has moved faster than anyone else. Let me correct myself: Canadians didn’t get any other option but to accept that their world had dramatically changed, that things had to change, and that this comes with a cost. What’s happening now, as I see it, is that many other countries are coming to the conclusion that heaving to, waiting, and slowly adapting is no longer an option. That citizens of other countries are coming to that conclusion. I’m talking about European countries now, but I’m sure it’s true elsewhere too.

Now, things don’t look the same in every European country. Europe is a cage full of crickets. Bizarrely, I’ve come to believe that this is a form of strength, precisely for the same reason democracies tend to be more stable than autocratic regimes. Specifically, it’s impossible for a Trump to happen in Europe, if only because what position would he occupy? Yes, a Trump-like figure could emerge here or there, but with so many decisions requiring unanimity or a supermajority, countries without a Trump would still have a lot of power. European countries are quite integrated. If Le Pen wins in France and does even a fraction of what Trump is doing, besides the fact that the country would be literally burning, she would still have to consider what other European governments and citizens think. I mean, small changes in ECB policy, or even just statements from the Bundesbank, could push France into a debt crisis in no time. As I said, seeing Trump in action has made me think of Europe’s cricket cage status as a strength. At the same time, it makes Europe move slower and in a fuzzy way. Canada is not a cricket cage, and that’s why Carney has been able to be much more determined.

So, Europe is a cage full of crickets, but it seems clear that most European countries—and more importantly, most Europeans—think that if push comes to shove, it’s better to be in the same boat as the other crickets. Canadians would probably like to find themselves in the situation of France or Belgium, having to deal with those other noisy annoying crickets because they depend on them, but being much less dependent on what looks like a crazy elephant. Anyway, here in Europe, the idea that “we are in the midst of a rupture” and not just a passing storm is clearly sinking in. Although our politicians don’t say it yet—probably because Europeans are still moving in that direction—a speech about not telling fairy tales about the advantages of integration when it is precisely this integration that is being used as a weapon is clearly resonating. People are also intuitively understanding that “strategic autonomy” comes with a price, a price one would prefer not to pay, but that one must pay if one wants to manage risks. Vance’s speech in Munich a year ago played a role. Trump’s tariffs on that Orwellian “Liberation Day” played a role. Trump’s White House meeting with Zelensky played a role. The US cutting off Ukrainian access to military intelligence to force them to sign the mineral deal played a role. Musk temporarily interrupting Starlink in Ukraine played a role. The US showing a middle finger to the world on climate change played a role. The blackmail to get a clearly unfair trade deal—a deal that is not yet ratified by the European Parliament and I don’t see how it ever will be—played a role. The National Security Strategy, the nonsense about freedom of speech, the direct intervention in European politics, all played a role. All of that has been leading European countries to derisk from the US. And they have been derisking. Much of it in a quiet way, with small steps, but I think Europe is actually much less dependent on the US now than it was a year ago. The process is just beginning, but every couple of days one hears something new. Europe is moving in that direction, and it will continue to do so. But if the accumulation of those US actions already changed the mood in Europe, it seems to me that what happened with Greenland has had the effect of an earthquake. Or rather, several earthquakes. First, the clearly empty reasons the US gave for wanting to own Greenland. Then the threat of military invasion. Then the tariffs—seen here as sanctions—imposed on some European NATO countries that dared to send a handful of soldiers to Greenland, largely taking the alleged US security concerns at face value. I have no idea how Quislings like Orbán will act, but the US has created a huge consensus among European politicians and citizens that heaving to is no longer an option.

Today, maybe right now, Trump is speaking in Davos, but I’d bet anything that he’ll make a splash again. And not a positive one. He’ll probably ramble and lie, but I guess he’ll want to play his role to the fullest, and I expect the whole thing will escalate. Tomorrow, the European Council is meeting to discuss how to react to those sanctions over the Greenland soldiers. Europeans won’t break diplomatic relations, but with or without Orbán, they will react.

Now, what could they do? Well, at the very least, I expect they will decide to implement the economic measures (worth 93 billion euros) they had prepared in case there was no trade deal with the US. More precisely, I expect they will say that these measures will come into effect if the new US tariffs actually materialize on February 1st—that is, in a week. There probably won’t be a unified Churchillian speech, but it will happen. At the end of the day, only a qualified majority is needed to pass this. The EU could also apply the Anti-Coercion Mechanism, something France explicitly calls for and Germany seems to support. I’m guessing this won’t be applied now. But if the US reacts to the EU’s countermeasures—and who thinks it will take it on the chin?—then things will escalate further. Not to mention what could happen if the US actually uses military force to take Greenland.

Now, what is the Anti-Coercion Mechanism? It’s something the EU passed to prevent external actors from coercing the EU or individual EU countries. It allows for additional tariffs, import/export restrictions, banning companies from public procurement, and limits on intellectual property rights. What’s important is that the Anti-Coercion Mechanism also only needs a qualified majority. An escalation of the trade war with the US would be costly for Europe, but the two perceived largest risks are military dependence and technological dependence. Both are real, and the world would be a better place if one didn’t have to worry about such things. But “nostalgia is not a strategy,” as Carney said. Military and technological dependencies are real, but by now I believe they are much less dramatic than they seem.

First, Europe is definitely taking its own defense seriously, and although there is still a long way to go, it’s not as if Russia could march through the Champs-Élysées. Yes, Europe depends on the US for intelligence. Yes. But if I understand correctly, Ukraine mostly needs US intelligence to detect the early launch of ballistic missiles. Well, Russia launches 2-3 such missiles every day, and Ukraine just has an interception rate of just 21%. This means that losing US intelligence would boil down to maybe not being able to stop 1 out of the 5 ballistic missiles launched every 2 days. It’s better to have the ability to detect those launches, but not being able to do so wouldn’t lead the Ukrainians to give up. The Ukrainians also don’t have the US’s transport capabilities and other strategic enablers, and yet they are still there. If Russia did anything, say in Lithuania, it would be horrible, but Europe would defend itself, and it would be much worse for Russia. I mean, if Russia attacked Lithuania, it’s impossible to imagine that neighboring countries wouldn’t do anything. If Poland is involved, then Germany would be involved within a week. And if Germany is, everyone is. And it’s evident that if Europe dedicated even a fraction of what Russia is dedicating to war production, Russia would lose. I mean, it might take a while, measured in months, but if the Ukrainians can send X number of drones every day to hit Russia’s infrastructure, how many could Europe send if Volkswagen started producing them? Nobody is talking about marching to Moscow, but Russia would lose. Nobody is saying it wouldn’t be horrible, but Europe could defend itself. I just hope the Russians aren’t under the illusion that they’d only be fighting Lithuania.

Second, Europe is also technologically dependent on the US. But how? First, there’s the fact that the US is more technologically advanced. Yes, but how many years of advantage? I might be too optimistic, but in the long term, and even the medium term, this advantage doesn’t play much of a role. What’s more important is that there are dependencies on companies like Microsoft and Google. But how dependent? I mean, there are short- and medium-term dependencies. In the long and medium term, it would suck not to have Windows updates, but my computer would still work, and who thinks alternatives wouldn’t materialize? These alternatives might be less convenient, more fractured, or more expensive, but they would exist. It’s just one of Germany’s 17 federal states, but Schleswig-Holstein is well on its way to becoming US tech-independent, and this is without the external pressure of having to do so. So, if it’s neither the long term nor the medium term, the real dependence is maybe in the short term. There, things are less clear to me. Personally, I’d be fine, I think, because for the past year I’ve been moving to use European cloud providers for everything, and I’m there, I believe. But what would happen if, from today to tomorrow, US tech were no longer available in Europe? Recall that this is one of the options of the Anti-Coercion Mechanism. I guess it could also be part of US escalation. What would happen? I evidently have no idea, but states have a lot of power. A few years ago, Spanish air traffic controllers walked out, and within hours they were militarized, and facing the risk of a military tribunal, they backed down. If the impossible happened, if Google stopped servicing Europe overnight, there would be a few days of chaos (and I think it makes sense to protect oneself against that), but states have power, and they would use it.

I evidently hope that none of these things happen, and if I were American, I’d wish for the same, but Europe’s dependence on the US is much less absolute than it seems, at least if citizens feel that what is happening is being forced on them by that same US. This is how Canadians feel, and this is how Europeans are increasingly feeling. In other words, Europeans are also coming to think that “we have to take the world as it is, not wait around for the world we wish to be.”

Probably it won’t come to war with Russia, nor will Google stop working in Europe, but I’m pretty sure there’s going to be escalation before anything stable emerges. But although it feels crazy to even consider these things, “nostalgia is not a viable strategy.” And in the medium term, man will the world have changed.